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Abstract To investigate possible de-identification meth-
odologies within the Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing
for imaging (XDS-I) environment in order to provide
strengthened support for image data exchange as part
of clinical research projects. De-identification, using
anonymization or pseudonymization, is the most com-
mon method to perform information removal within
DICOM data. However, it is not a standard part of the
XDS-I profiles. Different methodologies were observed
to define how and where de-identification should take
place within an XDS environment used for scientific
research. De-identification service can be placed in three
locations within the XDS-I framework: 1) within the
Document Source, 2) between the Document Source
and Document Consumer, and 3) within the Document
Consumer. First method has a potential advantage with
respect to the exposure of the images to outside systems
but has drawbacks with respect to additional hardware
and configuration requirements. Second and third meth-
od have big concern in exposing original documents
with all identifiable data being intact after leaving the
Document Source. De-identification within the Docu-
ment Source has more advantages compared to the other
methods. On the contrary, it is less recommended to
perform de-identification within the Document Consum-
er since it has the highest risk of the exposure of pa-
tients identity due to the fact that images are exposed
without de-identification during the transfers.
Keywords XDS . XDS-I . Cross-enterprise document
sharing . De-identification . Clinical Research .
Patient data privacy
Introduction
Medical imaging informatics has brought up numerous advan-
tages and offers social, economic, clinical, and technical ben-
efits for patient care. It plays an important role as it enables the
establishment of an affordable yet high quality level of
healthcare. Furthermore, the presence of imaging informatics
in clinical trials and research promotes standardization in or-
der to utilize the image for quantification and diagnosis and
later enables the exchange or sharing of the acquired and de-
rived data among enterprises appropriately in a quick and
convenient manner.
Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine
(DICOM) [1] has been widely adopted nowadays as the uni-
versal standard of the medical image file format and commu-
nication protocol [2]. It is also claimed as a major step forward
since it provides easy utilization of images in case of electron-
ic storage and transfer in a multi-vendor environment [3].
DICOM introduces an explicit information object for various
formats of (image) data and utilizes other standards to facili-
tate imaging integration in the health care enterprises [4].
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To perform safe, secure and standardized clinical data shar-
ing in a network of trusted partners, the Cross-Enterprise Doc-
ument Sharing (XDS) profile [5] was initiated as one of the
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) [6] profiles. How-
ever, solely adopting the protocol may lead to a security or
interoperability flaw [7]. Some studies have provided modifi-
cations tailored to the protocol to enhance its sharing function
[7, 8]. Later, a content profile to extend the XDS profile was
developed to describe how the image and report data are
shared between health enterprises. This extended profile is
known as the Cross-Enterprises Document Sharing for Imag-
ing (XDS-I) profile [9] and it has several advantages in reduc-
ing the network traffic and preventing image data duplication
while still able to make the best use of medical imaging itself.
Most of the Trans-Institutional health information systems
are still facing significant challenges of data transfer and com-
munication [10]. Furthermore, when employed in a research
setting, the implementation of XDS-I introduces the challenge
of providing convenient and easy access to the shared study-
related data from other enterprises without compromising pa-
tient privacy and patient data confidentiality. This involves the
very important question of where to implement and execute
the de-identification tasks within the XDS-I environment to
provide an optimal solution for clinical research purposes both
in sense of security and practicality. In this work, we investi-
gate possible methodologies for image de-identification with-
in the XDS-I environment, with their respective advantages
and disadvantages, to provide improved support for image
data exchange as part of clinical research projects.
Materials and methods
As a widely used standard, DICOM provides the ability to
communicate any kind of medical information together with
its corresponding images from any type of (DICOM compat-
ible) acquisition device. It standardizes the handling, storing,
printing, and transmitting of information in medical imaging.
It introduces explicit information objects for various formats
of data [1] and utilizes other standards to facilitate imaging
integration in the health care enterprise [4].
A DICOM file consists of two parts, the image itself (pixels
data) and a header with meta-elements containing any infor-
mation regarding the patient, institution, study, or pixel data.
The header also involves public data such as patient name and
number that will lead to the identity of a particular patient and
thus introduces security and privacy issues since medical and
administration staff have direct access to these data [11]. How-
ever, the risks are not only related to the header information
directly connected to the identity of the patient. More general
study information, also available in the header of a DICOM
file, holds for example information about the study performed,
the institutions that participate and the staff involved. The
aggregation of this information from the DICOM header
could on itself or combined with other sources of information
also be used to track patient information and reveal the iden-
tity of a specific patient indirectly. This already introduces
risks with respect to security and privacy within the walls of
one institution. However, when images are shared among
health enterprises without proper protection, the possible risks
concerning data protection and securing patient privacy both
increase.
De-identification of the DICOM tag elements should there-
fore be performed adequately by removing or changing all
possibly sensitive information from the DICOMheader. There
are two known methods to perform such tasks, anonymization
and pseudonymization.
Anonymization is claimed to be the most secure approach
to ensure the privacy of DICOM data since it fully uncouples
the data from the original patient [12]. It is used to completely
remove confidential entries in the standard DICOM data dic-
tionary, which could be used to derive the patient’s real iden-
tity, either by themselves or in combination with other entries.
This method is aimed to gain an irreversible result in order to
reduce the probability of revealing the patients identity.
Pseudonymization uses artificial identifiers to replace the
most identifying fields within a data record. The purpose of
adding these artificial identifiers or pseudonyms is to maker
the data record less identifying One of the reasons to choose
this method instead of anonymization is to provide an ability
to trace back the real identity of the subject involved. This
possibility of tracing back is useful when an appropriate fol-
low up is necessary for the study or an aggregation of longi-
tudinal data is important. Therefore, instead of removing data
completely, a modification is done in such way that the asso-
ciated parties (in most cases the principle investigator and/or
data manager of a research project) are still able to obtain the
real identity of the subject while attempts to identify the pa-
tient directly can be avoided. Thus, only necessary data are
pseudonymized while the remaining fields should be made
anonymous.
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) is an organiza-
tion that develops and introduces profiles that are aimed at
improving interoperability in healthcare. IHE profiles are not
a technical standard. Therefore the initiated profiles are mainly
an open infrastructure which is simple, easy, vendor indepen-
dent, and free to implement by all enterprises involved [13].
The XDS-I profile was initiated by the IHE to provide a struc-
ture for an image sharing environment through a trusted net-
work providing diagnostic related reports and information be-
tween healthcare enterprises. It uses existing standards in
medical imaging, document management, and communica-
tion. It is a framework that describes the registration, query,
retrieval, and publication of clinical documents.
XDS-I employs actors that can be grouped into Document
Source, Document Repository, Document Registry, and
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Document Consumer. A Document Source is responsible for
the document publishing and provides the clinical documents
to a Document Consumer or the Document Repository. A
Document Consumer is the actor that requests and retrieves
documents from the XDS network, either from a Document
Repository or a Document Source. The Document Repository
handles the document storage in a transparent, secure, reliable,
and persistent manner [14]. It is also responsible for delivering
the requested documents to the Document Consumer, there-
fore the Document Repository should always be available. In
XDS-I, images are not stored in the Repository. Instead, a
small DICOM object called Key Object Selection (KOS) doc-
ument containing a list of UID references is stored so that
documents of interest can be easily found and retrieved from
their original source location. The Document Registry is the
actor that indexes all published documents and repositories
involved in data sharing. Actors and transactions involved in
the XDS-I environment are shown in Fig. 1.
The registry may contain a set of attributes of documents
including sensitive data such as patient’s name, author’s insti-
tution, and author’s name. In the clinical research environ-
ment, the shared data are not allowed to have sensitive or
private information embedded in it since that information
can be used by other parties to trace the identity of the patient
or study participant. Even though XDS-I offers a secure trans-
fer over a trusted network, further efforts are needed to ensure
that the sensitive information is eliminated or encoded. Fur-
thermore, the original data must remain stored at the source
domain and no duplication should be made in local or central
repositories.
De-identification of DICOM data, as previously described,
is the most common method to perform information removal.
However, since de-identification is not a standard part of the
XDS profiles, different methodologies could be used to enable
the de-identification within XDS. Therefore, in this study dif-
ferent methodologies were defined and evaluated to decide
how and where the de-identification should take place within
an XDS environment used for scientific research.
Results
Services can be implemented in three methods to perform the
de-identification of the DICOM files within the XDS-I frame-
work. First, de-identification can be performed within the
Document Source before images are sent to Consumer
(Fig. 2). Second, images are de-identified after images are
received by the Document Consumer (Fig. 3). Third, de-
identification is done between the Document Source and Doc-
ument Consumer (Fig. 4). The last two methods require addi-
tional services to remove identifiable elements in the KOS
documents and images itself to make sure that data are de-
identified before being stored in the Repository.
Each of the methods has its own benefits and disadvan-
tages. Several criteria were examined to see the effects of the
position of de-identification to the whole process. Those
criteria were the required additional processing time, the speed
of processing, additional hardware, and the degree of identity
protection during transfers.
De-identifying images within the Document Source re-
quires more processing time within the source itself since
the requested documents will be processed before they are
sent to either Document Repository or Document Consumer.
The waiting time of the Consumer becomes longer depending
on the amount of images being processed in the de-
identification queue.
By processing images within the source, additional hard-
ware and software are needed to be installed at each site of
origin of the collected data. This implies that the amount of
additional systems is at least equal to the amount of the enter-
prises which are involved in the data gathering of the research
project. But this method has a potential advantage with respect
to the exposure of the images to outside systems, because the
images are ensured to be de-identified before leaving the site
of origin. Figure 5 shows the document flows through this
methodology.
The second method is to perform de-identification within
the Consumer. Document transfers require similar time com-
pared to the normal flow of transfer within the XDS-I envi-
ronment since no further actions will be taken before the data
reach the Consumer. Additional time will only be needed in
the Consumer itself since data are processed further within the
Consumer as shown in Fig. 6. This method has drawbacks
with respect to additional hardware and configuration
requirements.
All de-identification processes will be done by the Con-
sumer. Therefore, in case of multiple consumers, all con-
sumers should be synchronized and use the same de-
identification protocols which is not a practical solution. The
biggest concern regarding this method is the fully exposed
original documents with all identifiable data being intact be-
fore they reach the consumer, posing a higher risk of identity
breach.
In the third method images are de-identified after being
transmitted by the Document Source on their way to the Con-
sumer. In this case, an additional service will be required as
mediator between the Source and Consumer, for example a
de-identification server within the Affinity Domain. This ser-
vice will be used to receive images that are sent by the Doc-
ument Source and appropriately process the documents before
forwarding them to the Document Consumer. The mediators
will take care of the entire de-identification process. Thus, the
processing of images may have a hiccup within the affinity
domain when there are many transactions in the queue due to
many and/or large requests from the consumer or intensive
transfers from the source. This method is shown in Fig. 7.
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This method also has the risk of original images being
exposed since they are transferred without any prior de-
identification process from the site of origin into the affinity
domain before reaching the de-identifier. It means that, upon
request, the images from a publisher should always be sent to
the repository and thus a consumer could not get the images
directly from the source. Therefore, this method will change
the scheme of XDS-I itself where images should only be ex-
changed directly by Source and Consumer without being kept
by services in between. This would give a disadvantage in
terms of simplicity of the transfer of the images and may
hamper the workflow of the XDS-I domain.
Fig. 1 Actors and transactions in XDS-I. Document Consumer queries
documents from the registrty and retrieve images either from repository or
directly from source; Document Source provides the requested
documents and transfers them to the consumer or repository; Document
Registry indexes all published documents and repositories involved in
data sharing; Document Repository handles the documents storage
Fig. 2 De-identification is performed within the Document Source
(shown as green area), to ensure data are de-identified before leaving
the source
Fig. 3 De-identification is performed in the Document Consumer
(shown as green area). They are de-identified before being stored
within the consumer’s domain
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Table 1 shows a summary of the three methodologies based
on four criteria. It is shown that the second method has the
highest risk of the exposure of patients’ identity due to the fact
that images are exposed without de-identification during the
transfers. Therefore, it is less recommended to do the de-
identification at the consumer site.
Discussion
Processing time
Transfer of image data with the de-identification process done
within the publisher domain may suffer from long waiting
queues due to a large number of requests from multiple con-
sumers at the same time, all requiring de-identification and
transfer. However, in most research projects this scenario
would not occur frequently and the retrieval of data in research
studies are mostly not a time critical process. Comparing this
to the method in which de-identification is done outside the
Source, which likely is within the affinity domain, images will
always go through the repository since the images cannot be
sent directly from Source to Consumer.
Workload and processing speed
Using the de-identification within the Consumer method,
workload will depend on the requests a Source received.
Therefore, the transfers of data are quite equally divided if
Fig. 4 De-identification is performed within the Document Repository
with additional required service placed between source and consumer
(shown as green area), toensure data are de-identified before stored in
the repository
Fig. 5 De-identification of data is done within the Document Source. De-identified documents are sent from the source
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all Sources receive requests with a nearly equal amount of
data. A similar situation holds for the de-identification in the
Consumer where Consumers request the same amount of data
as the first option. Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, the
transfer with de-identification being done within the Source
and Consumer will be highly utilizing the de-identifier within
the affinity domain causing high workload at that de-identifi-
er, possibly leading to reduced processing speed.
Additional hardware
Consideration of additional hardware and software will favor
the de-identification between the Source and Consumer since
there is a possibility to add only one additional de-
identification system. The use of paid software will enhance
the benefit of this option although open source alternatives do
exist that could be used [15]. In case of hardware require-
ments, the method with de-identification being done within
Source or Consumer will need as much additional services
as the number of Sources or Consumers. Meanwhile method
with de-identification being done in between requires a much
higher specification hardware regarding processing power,
memory and temporary storage to handle the centralized de-
identification which will most likely lead to higher cost.
However, the cost is not only dictated by the hardware but
also by the cost of service and maintenance required for the
hard- and software. The centralized node simplifies the service
and maintenance of the servers lowering this part of the
expenses.
Identity protection
The chance of data being captured and directly reveal patient
identity is higher when de-identification is performed after the
images are transferred out of the source. The images are mere-
ly transferred without a prior de-identification process. There-
fore, all sensitive information is still embedded in the images.
The method in which data are de-identified before being
saved in the Document Consumer is regarded as less favorable
since it has the highest risk of images being sent without any
de-identification first.
An additional problem in the de-identification of medical
image data is the burnt-in information sometimes included in
the DICOM image during data acquisition or secondary cap-
ture. That kind of information cannot be removed easily using
the DICOM header de-identification. Providing data with
burnt-in patient information within the image itself is as harm-
ful as transferring DICOM data with all original header
Fig. 6 De-identification of data is done within the Document Consumer. Fully exposed original documents are sent through the network without prior
de-identification
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elements left intact. Blacking out the pixels that contain sensi-
tive information should be performed. In themethod, this issue
already exists since the data are transferred out from the Source
without de-identification. Blacking out pixels will be per-
formed either within Consumer with the second method or
within affinity domain using the third option. Meanwhile, the
issue still can be tackledwhen first method is used since the de-
identification is done before images leave the XDS Source.
However, this will lead to the caution of selecting the de-
identification tools because not all toolkit can perform the task.
Furthermore, a three dimensional image reconstruction,
mostly from CTor MRmodalities of the head, combined with
Fig. 7 De-identification of data is done within the Affinity Domain. Images sent from the Document source are not de-identified
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facial recognition software may also reveal the identity of
patients [16, 17]. Several other methods are being investigated
to be developed and provide a better protection to the patient
data [18]
In order to keep the de-identification information well se-
cured, a mapping database pointing to the origin of the images
should be stored in such a way or place that only authorized
parties are able to determine the original data. This kind of
database can be placed at different locations. For example, it
can be stored locally in the Source site, within the affinity
domain, or be implemented through a trusted third party.
When de-identification is done within the Source, it will be
more practical if the records of the original metadata are kept
within the Source itself and only deliver the new keys and a
link to owner institution to the registry or the trusted third
parties. Meanwhile, when de-identifications are done between
Source and Consumer, the mapped identities can be sent back
and recorded in Source or put it right away into database
server within affinity domain.
Conclusion
De-identification of images within the XDS-I environ-
ment is required when data sharing is implemented in
clinical research. Comparison regarding the location of
de-identification process to be placed within the XDS-I
environment for clinical research has been done. Identity re-
moval canmost safely be donewithin the Document Source to
prevent a privacy breach.
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